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Abstract
By examining the impact of a real estate bubble on residential distribution in
Tokyo and Osaka, we show that land price fluctuations influence the residential
location choice within a metropolitan area. During a period of rising land prices,
land developers favor commercial development over residential use in the central
city, thereby increasing the daytime population while decreasing the residential
population there. Thus, commercial-residential segregation is intensified. In a
downturn period, however, with the shrinking demand for commercial space,
homes are favored by land developers. Hence, gentrification occurs as an unin-
tended consequence of this endogenous conversion of the land-use pattern.
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1 Introduction
The share of the central city population in the major metropolitan areas (MAs) of the
United States fell significantly in the second half of the 20th century. This situation has
been attributed to factors, such as the increases in car-use and highway construction
(LeRoy and Sonstelie, 1983; Baum-Snow, 2007; Garcia-López, 2010), housing capital
depreciation and filtering down (Glaeser and Gyourko, 2005; Rosenthal, 2008; Brueck-
ner and Rosenthal, 2009), racial residential segregation (Boustan and Margo, 2013),
and issues in coordinating redevelopment (Rosenthal and Ross, 2015; Brooks and Lutz,
2016; Owens III et al., 2019).
After 2000, however, the residential distribution reversed in some urban areas.
Population, as well as the relative income and the proportion of college graduates, were
found to grow again in the central neighborhoods of US MAs and select European
cities like London and Barcelona, thus forming an increasingly polarized urban spatial
structure. The observed gentrification is argued to be associated with a new round of
neighborhood housing cycles or neighborhood externalities (Brueckner and Rosenthal,
2009; Guerrieri et al., 2013), an increasing desire to save commuting time and enjoy
the non-tradable amenities in the central city (Hamnett, 2003; McKinnish et al., 2010;
Couture and Handbury, 2017; Lee and Lin, 2018; Su, 2019), changing labor market
opportunities across locations (Baum-Snow and Hartley, 2020), and policies on urban
renewal and environmental justice (Gamper-Rabindran and Timmins, 2011; González-
Pampillón et al., 2019).1
Despite the above studies, research on this issue is far from conclusive. By exploiting
a real estate bubble that occurred in the major MAs of Japan as a source of variation,
we present the first evidence of a mechanism where price fluctuations in the real estate
market act as a determinant of gentrificationwithin anMA through land-use conversion.
This real estate bubble, beginning from the early 1980s and collapsing in the early 1990s,
was among the most aggressive in the history of Japan’s urban development. Violent
property price fluctuations mainly occurred in a relatively short period (one decade),
thereby ensuring that the demographic pattern and infrastructure construction that may
affect intra-MA population dynamics remained practically unchanged. This situation
allows us to clearly identify the causal effects of land price fluctuations on the dynamics
of residential location.
The key idea behind our study is that central cities are likely to be dominated
by buildings for commercial use when the economy is in an upswing. Meanwhile,
during the economic downturn, land development will relatively shift from commercial
toward residential construction. There are theory-based reasons for the two aspects.
First, housing rent is more inelastic than office and commercial rent in the central
cities. That is, the price elasticity of demand is more elastic for residential lands than
commercial lands. Second, land price elasticity of a building’s height is smaller for
residential than for commercial buildings because the elasticity of substitution between
1In addition, Boustan et al. (2019) investigate whether a massive housing investment in the form
of high-rise condominium towers has contributed to the gentrification of a city. They find that the
condominium development has no causal impact on the resident income, although they are positively
correlated.
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land and capital is smaller. That is, in the central cities with increasing land prices,
developers tend to raise building heights to exploit the value of space in the sky fully.
Commercial buildings are, in turn, preferred over residential buildings and housing
supply is condensed in central cities when there is a real estate bubble, thus intensifying
commercial-residential segregation. In contrast, housing supply is increased in the case
of declining land prices, thereby encouraging residential recentralization.
We examine whether this conversion of land development strategy will affect
housing supply and, in turn, residential location choice by comparing the central city
population growth performance to that of the surrounding areas before, during, and
after the bubble period. The non-central surrounding areas are taken as the comparison
group because their land price changes during the bubble period were much less
significant. Therefore, the land-use pattern was less responsive to this event. Our
analyses are based on nearly 300 urban municipalities in the Tokyo and Osaka MAs
(the two largest MAs of the country, covering nearly half of the country’s population) in
the 1980–2017 period. The city of Tokyo (Osaka) is the central city of the Tokyo (Osaka)
MA.
Prior to the empirical analysis, we first illustrate our ideas with prominent stylized
facts. We find that commercial land prices in the central cities did rose (fell) much
faster than those of residential lands during the period of the bubble economy (bubble
burst). Thus, central city housing construction was limited (expanded). Consistently,
the residential population of central cities declined in the price-surging period but grew
significantly after the bubble burst. In contrast, daytime population, which reflects the
density of commercial activities, first grew and then shrank in the central cities.2 [Unless
otherwise specified, the population mentioned in the paper refers to the residential (or
nighttime) population.]
Our empirical analyses proceed as follows. First, using a cross-section regression, we
demonstrate that municipalities with land use that is more dominated by commercial
activities during the bubble period (proxied by a lower nighttime population relative
to the daytime population in 1990) show more significant residential growth in the
subsequent two decades. This result remains after controlling for the initial population
density and distance from the central business district (CBD) of the MA. The pattern
suggests that the faster population growth in these areas might have been associated
with a more intensive land-use conversion toward housing development after the
bubble burst. Second, we examine the robustness of the initial result using a within
municipality estimator and a larger sample. Third, our results are further confirmed
by using an alternative measure of the explanatory variable, controlling a set of time-
varying confounding factors (which are potentially associated with population growth
but not captured by the standard two-way fixed effects) and regressing for a sub-sample
(which is more likely to be involved in the residential location choice behavior within
the central city commuter zone).
We are also concerned about the issue of reverse causality. Land-use conversion and
housing construction boom in the central cities, which were induced by the bubble burst,
likely impact population growth. Meanwhile, the reverse is also possible. To address
2Daytime population is calculated as follows: nighttime population + the influx of commuters and
students from other areas − the outflow of commuters and students to other areas.
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this issue, we consider the impacts of the housing construction boom by examining the
population growthwith a time lag. We find that the population growth of amunicipality
in year t is positively related to its scale of housing starts in t–3, t–2, and t–1. However,
the population growth in the past three years does not significantly predict the current
intensity of housing starts. Therefore, gentrification in the central cities might have
been triggered by the observed post-bubble housing boom, not the reverse. Finally,
advances in transportation technology and policies associated with land-use regulation
could, in principle, impact residential location choice. To rule out these possibilities, we
check the related information and find they are largely unchanged during the study
period.
We next provide extended results regarding the changes in the housing structure.
High-rise condominiums dominate the new housing supply during the central city
housing boom. Meanwhile, the proportion of commercial buildings in the central
cities regarding the completion of new high-rise buildings has declined significantly.
Moreover, new housing in the central cities was increasingly concentrated in large-sized
"built-to-sell" dwelling units (70–100 m2 in floor area), while most housing starts in
the bubble period were for small "built-to-rent" homes (40–60 m2). This situation is in
line with the growing relative income of residents in the central cities accompanied by
gentrification.
Given these results, we conclude that land price fluctuations impacted land-use
patterns (for residential or commercial development), which is associated with the
housing supply in related areas. The latter, in turn, affected population growth. This
conclusion explains the recent gentrification in the central cities of the Tokyo and
Osaka MAs. This study contributes to the literature in two aspects. First, we are
evidently the first to explain the origin of gentrification from the perspective of land
price fluctuations and endogenous land-use conversion. This supply-side explanation
differs from the existing literature, which employs a demand-side perspective, such as
the changes in the locations of employment opportunities and residents’ preference, or
posits that gentrification is the consequence of an exogenous community revitalization
policy. Second, our study extends the research on gentrification by focusing on two
typical Asian mega-cities; existing studies mainly focus on relatively smaller cities in
North America and Europe. As stated by Brueckner et al. (1999) and Tabuchi (2019),
residential locations in the major US MAs, Paris, and Tokyo are systematically different:
the rich and poor colocate in the central areas of Tokyo, whereas the poor (rich) are
concentrated in the central locations of US MAs (Paris). This situation implies that the
mechanism of gentrification might also be different across city forms.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the back-
ground information. Section 3 introduces the hypothesis and stylized facts. Sections
4 and 5 detail the empirical results and additional discussion, respectively. Section 6
concludes with policy implications.
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2 Background information
2.1 Demographic pattern of the Tokyo and Osaka MAs
Figure 1: The locations of the Tokyo and Osaka MAs.
Major MAs tend to experience more significant land price fluctuations than small
city areas during a bubble period, and land supply tends to be tighter andmore sensitive
to land price changes. We, therefore, focus our analysis on the two largest Japanese
MAs (Tokyo and Osaka), which include nine out of the 47 prefectures of the country
(see Figure 1).3 They include 44.6% of Japan’s population (as of 2015), although the
land area is only 8.9% of the total. The economic agglomeration in the cities of Tokyo
and Osaka is even more extensive; they account for only 0.6% of the country’s total
land while accommodating 9.4% of the residential population and absorbing 11.0%
of the daytime population in 2015. Therefore, by studying these two MAs, we can
systematically evaluate the gentrification process, if any, in Japan’s densely populated
urban areas.4
The Tokyo and Osaka MAs are both highly polarized; the densest municipalities are
located closer to central Tokyo or Osaka (Figure 2). To measure the inter-MA population
3The Tokyo MA includes four prefectures: Tokyo, Kanagawa, Chiba, and Saitama. The Tokyo
prefecture comprises the city of Tokyo and the surrounding municipality-level cities, towns, and villages
that are economically and socially integrated with it. The city of Tokyo consists of 23 municipality-level
wards. The Osaka MA includes five prefectures: Osaka, Kyoto, Hyogo, Nara, and Wakayama. The Osaka
prefecture comprises the city of Osaka and dozens of municipality-level administrative units. The city of
Osaka consists of 24 municipality-level wards.
4In 1990, there were 55 municipality-level wards and cities with a population density greater than
10,000 persons per km2 in Japan, within which 29 are in the Tokyo MA, and the remaining 26 are in the
Osaka MA.
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Figure 2: Population density relative to the distance from the central city.
Notes: See data sources in Table A1.
dynamics, we further define a hierarchical structure with multiple levels of centrality.
Regarding the Tokyo MA, the first level is the entire MA (34.0 million residents in 2005),
the second is the city of Tokyo (8.3 million), and the third (fourth) is the eight (three)
central municipality-level wards of Tokyo city, with a residential population of 1.6 (0.3)
million (see their locations in Figure 3a). The eight central wards are generally regarded
as the CBDs of Tokyo, among which the three central wards (Chiyoda, Chuo, and
Minato) have the highest density of commercial activities. The hierarchical structure
of the Osaka MA is analogous. The first level is the entire MA (19.3 million residents
in 2005), the second is the city of Osaka (2.5 million), and the third is the three central
wards of Osaka city (200,000 residents; Kita, Chuo, and Nishi) (Figure 3b). Note that
Osaka city is much smaller in both land area and population size than Tokyo city; its
CBD is, therefore, relatively smaller.
2.2 The real estate market of Japan, 1980–2017
Japan witnessed a bubble in the real estate market (which also involved other sectors)
in the 1980s. Regardless of the approach used to calculate the price index, average land
prices in Japan doubled in the period of 1980 to 1990; the main property appreciation
occurred in its major MAs. Subsequently, the real estate bubble collapsed. By 2017, the
land prices in Japan had not yet recovered to its early-1990s peak when the bubble burst.
The causes of the bubble and its burst have been carefully studied in various streams
of literature and have been attributed to the over-relaxed macroeconomic policy and
external economic shocks (e.g., the Yen appreciation following the 1985 Plaza Accord);
for more details, see, for example, Kanemoto (1997) and Nakamura and Saita (2007).
The left panel of Figure 4 shows the land prices by commercial and residential use
for the six largest cities in the 1980–2017 period, and the right panel shows the city of
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(a) The Tokyo MA (b) The Osaka MA
Figure 3: The hierarchical structure of the Tokyo and Osaka MAs.
Notes: (a): The zoomed view of the Tokyo MA. The black area indicates the three central wards of
Tokyo city, the area marked red (plus the three central wards) indicates the eight central wards, and
the area marked green (plus the eight central wards) indicates the city of Tokyo (622 km2). (b): The
zoomed map of the Osaka MA. The area marked red indicates the three central wards of Osaka city,
and the green area (plus the three central wards) indicates the city of Osaka (223 km2). The red lines are
prefectural boundaries, the blue lines are coastal lines, and the black (gray) lines are municipality-level
city/town/village (ward) boundaries.
Tokyo.5 In each group of samples, land prices increased dramatically in the 1980s. For
instance, commercial land prices in the city of Tokyo increased seven-fold between 1980
and 1990.
Dramatic fluctuations in land prices have affected the frequency of land transactions.
As presented in Figure 5, the number of land transactions decreased nationwide (as
well as in Tokyo; historical data for Osaka are not available) in the 1980s. This event
was partially because the landlords expected that their assets in hand would appreciate
further (Nakamura and Saita, 2007). The number of house tenure also decreased in this
period; the pattern was further magnified in major cities. According to Hirayama (2005,
2006), which summarized the number of first-time homebuyers in Japan from 1979
through 1998, 2,050,000 households moved from rental to owned homes nationwide
(185, 000 for the city of Tokyo) during the 1979–1983 period. The subsequent jump in
housing prices reduced this number to 1,736,000 and 1,659,000 during the 1984–1988
and 1989–1993 periods, respectively (147,000 and 107,000 for the city of Tokyo).
5"Land price index for the six largest cities" is a widely used indicator reflecting the trend of Japanese real
estate prices. The six largest cities are Tokyo, Osaka, Yokohama, Kobe, Kyoto, and Nagoya, of which five
are included in the Tokyo and Osaka MAs (except for Nagoya). Historical data for city-level land price
index are not readily available; we show the related data for the city of Tokyo only, which are estimated
by Shimizu and Nishimura (2007) using land transaction data.
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Figure 4: Land price fluctuations in the major urban areas of Japan.
Notes: Data for the six largest cities are obtained from the CEIC DATA, which report the average land
prices in these cities in July of each year (updated to 2002), and the Japanese Real Estate Statistics 2019,
released by the Mitsui Fudosan Co.,Ltd. (Planning and Research Department) (data of the 2003–2017
period). Data for the city of Tokyo are obtained from Shimizu and Nishimura (2007), which are only
available for the 1980–1998 period. The residential land price index is estimated based on the land
transactions in the Setagaya ward of Tokyo city, and the commercial land price index is estimated based
on its three central wards.
Nevertheless, after the downturn of property prices, the number of land transactions
in Tokyo city and the TokyoMA increased, although it continued to decrease nationwide
(Figure 5). The number of house tenures also rebounded to 2,124,000 for the entire
country during the 1994–1998 period (198,000 for the city of Tokyo) (Hirayama, 2005).
Thus, Tokyo witnessed a housing construction boom after the bubble burst, which will
be formally discussed later.
The commercial and residential land markets have notably exhibited different price
fluctuations during and after the bubble. In both plots of Figure 4, the appreciation of the
commercial land is muchmore significant than that of residential land during the bubble
period. That is, the capital gain is disproportionately larger for the former. Consistently,
as described in Shimizu et al. (2010), office buildings and commercial facilities were
intensively constructed in Japanese central cities during the bubble period, and small
houses and land were intensively bundled for office building development under
strong expectations of surging office rents (by contrast, housing rent is subject to strict
rent control). According to Oizumi (1994), in the city of Tokyo, the share of office in the
total floor area of buildings for all uses increased from 11% in 1972 to 16% in 1990; in its
three central wards, this figure increased from 44% to 56%.
However, after the bubble burst, commercial land has experienced more significant
capital losses; the price in the six largest cities (the city of Tokyo) fell to the 1980 level
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Figure 5: Number of land transactions.
Notes: Data on the number of land transactions are obtained from Nakamura and Saita (2007), which
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Human Rights, the Ministry of Justice.
in 2001 (1998) (Figure 4), whereas residential land maintained a capital return of 47%
(44%) (taking the 1980 price as a benchmark). That is, the demand for commercial
buildings, as well as prices, fell more than those for homes after the bubble burst (see
the green lines of Figure 4), which implies higher comparative returns from residential
development.
The scale of housing construction in the Tokyo and Osaka MAs responded to the
land price fluctuations.6 Figure 6 shows the number of housing starts in our sample
areas. The MA-level scales of housing starts before and after the bubble burst are
comparable. Although the number of housing starts exhibited a sharp drop in the
period of 1990 to 1992, it quickly recovered. Nevertheless, once we focus on the central
cities, especially on the CBDs, we find that there was a housing construction boom after
the bubble burst (relative to the bubble period).
The yearly housing starts stabilized below 500,000 m2 in the three central wards of
Tokyo during the 1980–1994 period, however, this figure soared rapidly to 1.7 million
in the 1994–2002 period (Figure 6). The proportion of housing starts (in m2) of the three
(eight) central wards of Tokyo in the total housing starts of the entire city was below
5% (20%) in the bubble period (left panel of Figure 7). However, it quickly jumped
to approximately 19% (34%) in the early 2000s. Similarly, the proportion of housing
starts in the city of Tokyo regarding the entire Tokyo MA increased. The right panel of
Figure 7 displays the patterns for Osaka, which are analogous. The proportion of Tokyo
(Osaka) city’s residential buildings in the total floor area of building starts has been
rising (i.e., the share of commercial and office buildings declined) since the collapse of
6New homes dominate the housing market of Japan because existing homes are discriminated against
in the mortgage market, and homebuyers prefer them less; for more details, see Kobayashi (2016).
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Figure 6: Number of housing starts.
Notes: See data sources in Table A1. Data for 2007 are missing.
the real estate bubble (Hirayama, 2005; see for more details in Section 5).
3 Hypothesis and stylized facts
Based on the background information, we propose a theory-based testable hypothesis
regarding the impacts of land price fluctuations on residential location choice to guide
our empirical analysis.
During the bubble economy, the density of business activity increased rapidly in
Tokyo andOsaka due to the large inflows of capital and employment. This situationmay
have led to a strong tendency for business activities to be concentrated in their CBDs,
which can be explained by two mechanisms. First is the well-known agglomeration
economies in production, as illustrated in the classic urban economics literature, such as
Fujita and Ogawa (1982) and Lucas and Rossi-Hansberg (2002). Second is a supply-side
factor that was recently introduced by Ahlfeldt and McMillen (2018); they find that
land price elasticity of building height is smaller for residential than for commercial
buildings because the elasticity of substitution between land and capital is smaller.7
Thus, in the case that land price increases and land developers make the buildings
7Since unit construction costs increase with building height, there exists a correspondence between
land price and building height. As land price increases, land developers tend to make the buildings
higher. Using historical building height and land price data on Chicago, Ahlfeldt and McMillen (2018)
find that it is more difficult to compensate residents than office users for the limited access to private and
communal exterior space, thereby making high-rise buildings more preferable for office uses than for
residents. Moreover, the building height elasticity of construction cost is larger for residential buildings.
The cost of height is higher for residential than for commercial buildings due to notable differences in
the design of buildings. That is, the losses of usable floor space as building height increases are different;
for more details, see Ahlfeldt and McMillen (2018). Moreover, Koster et al. (2013) suggest that office
rents are higher for high-rise buildings because of within-building agglomeration economies, landmarks,
and view effects. Liu et al. (2018) further find that high-productivity companies are located higher up in
high-rise office buildings; less productive offices are further down.
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Figure 7: Housing construction intensity in the central locations.
Notes: See data sources in Table A1. Data for 2007 are missing.
taller, construction for office uses are preferable to for residential use.
The facts justify these two mechanisms, as discussed previously. That is, there was
a stronger price appreciation in commercial land than in residential land in the central
cities during the bubble period, and housing development was restrained. By contrast,
commercial land experienced a disproportionate capital loss (relative to residential
land) in the period of market decline, and housing development was expanded (as in
Figures 4–6).8 Moreover, the changes in office and housing rent also coincide with the
above mechanisms. Office rents are generally higher than housing rents in Japanese
urban centers (Shimizu et al., 2010). Based on a privately collected database covering
more than 10,000 rent contracts in the city of Tokyo from 1991 to 2004, Shimizu et al.
(2010) find that, in only a tiny number of locations in Tokyo (most are in the periphery),
office rents are lower than housing rents (in an equivalent location) in 1991. However,
along with the burst of the bubble economy, an increasing number of locations, even in
the CBDs, exhibit lower rents for office space than for housing.
Based on the differential changes in land prices and land-use patterns, we expect
that the real estate bubble and the burst might have influenced the residential distribu-
tion within an MA.9 Our hypothesis is presented as follows: 1) Commercial-residential
segregation in the central cities would be strengthened during the period of the real estate
bubble. Thus, daytime population increased in the central cities and residential decentralization
occurred. 2) Along with the declining land prices and shrinking demand for commercial and
8Aside from the proposed explanation, macroeconomic policies, such as low interest rate and tax
reduction for purchasing homes, accelerated home purchases. They also contributed to the rebounding
of housing development in the central cities (Hirayama, 2005).
9Liu et al. (2016) also estimate the within-city heterogeneity in response to a real estate bubble; they
find relative prices between small and large houses were stable during the bubble period but diverged
after the bubble burst (small home price index fell more). Our study differs from their work by focusing
on the relative prices between residential land and commercial land.
10
office space after the bubble burst, there was an incentive for land developers to shift from com-
mercial to residential land use, thus resulting in an expansion of housing supply and residential
recentralization (or, gentrification).
Note that, although Japanese urban planning constraints, to some extent, prevent
housing lands from being used for other purposes, no legal regulations exist that pro-
hibit the conversion of commercial land into housing.10 Therefore, land-use conversion
is legally feasible in central city areas. The findings of Shimizu et al. (2010) can further
justify this situation. They find that vacancy rates soared in many office buildings of
Tokyo due to the collapse of the bubble economy; the recession prompted landlords to
switch from commercial land to housing development. Furthermore, as described in
Hideo (2014), after the bubble burst, many companies affected by the debt crisis had to
sell their land assets that were previously used as parking lots or offices. These assets
were mainly converted into high-rise condominiums.
To empirically test our hypothesis, we examine the population dynamics in central
cities before and after the bubble economy. Note that the land proportion by land-
use nature (e.g., residential, industrial, and commercial) is technically the most direct
way to justify our hypothesis on commercial-residential segregation. However, it is
practically not feasible because commercial land can easily be used for residential
purposes. Therefore, we use the daytime population as a proxy for the intensity of
land use for commercial activities in an area and nighttime (residential) population
as a proxy for the degree of residential land use in that area. If land use in central
cities is segregated (increasingly dominated by commercial use) during the bubble
period, we expect the nighttime (daytime) population to shrink (increase); that is, the
nighttime-to-daytime population ratio (hereafter, NDPR) declines.
Before we introduce our empirical strategy, Figure 8 displays the nighttime popu-
lation growth of each hierarchy of the Tokyo and Osaka MAs from 1980 to 2017. This
graph reveals many striking patterns. Although the two MAs, as a whole, exhibit solid
population growth, their central locations declined significantly during the bubble
period. The population size of central cities rebounded after 1995. Evidently, the popu-
lation increase in central city areas has been much faster than the larger metropolitan
region. Moreover, consistent with the changes in income composition that are found in
existing studies on gentrification, central locations have increasingly become attractive
for wealthy residents over time.11 This situation suggests that gentrification (not a
simple displacement of residents) occurred in central cities.
Figure 9 (left panel), which displays the daytime population in central cities, further
demonstrates our hypothesis. The growth of the daytime population was inversely
proportional to that of the nighttime population. It expanded in central locations during
the 1980–1990 period but decreased after the bubble burst. Moreover, more central
10In some cases, a change from residential to commercial regarding land use is possible. Moreover,
some housing buildings were informally used for commercial and office purposes during the bubble
period because office rents were higher than housing rents (Shimizu et al., 2010).
11The taxable income of the residents of the three central wards of Tokyo was 1.37 times that of the city
average during the 1990–1995 period. This figure increased to 1.61 in 2005 and to 1.69 in 2015. Regarding
the eight central wards, it increased from 1.11 during the 1990–1995 period to 1.21 in 2015 (Data sources:
The Residential Population Survey of Japan, various years).
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Figure 8: Residential population growth in the Tokyo and Osaka MAs.
Notes: See data sources in Table A1.
locations tend to show stronger growth during the bubble period. For example, the
three central wards of Tokyo (Osaka) reached an extremely high daytime population
density (63,000 (51,000) persons per km2) in 1990 and then lost 14% (16%) of their
daytime population in the subsequent two decades. Thus, NDPR first declined during
the 1980–1990 period and then rebounded after 1995 (Figure 9, right panel), implying
that the commercial-residential segregation in the central cities first exacerbated and
then weakened.
4 Econometric specification and results
According to the stylized facts described above, we can infer that the burst of the real
estate bubble was a promoter of gentrification in Tokyo and Osaka, if we are able to
confirm that a causal relationship exists after controlling for the confounding factors.
Note that the macroeconomic factors that triggered the bursting of the economic bubble
were not affected by the gentrification process of Japanese cities. The economic bubble
and the following burst also affected other sectors, such as the stock market. Therefore,
the exogeneity assumption is satisfied in analyzing the impacts of the bubble burst on
gentrification.
4.1 Cross-section estimates
We first examine the relationship between NDPR and post-1990 population growth
using cross-sectional data at the municipality level. Land development in municipalities
with a lower NDPR in 1990 tended to be more dominated by commercial use during the
bubble period. These municipalities are, in turn, expected to have experienced a more
12
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Figure 9: Daytime population growth in the Tokyo and Osaka MAs.
Notes: See data sources in Table A1. Daytime population data are available in a five-year frequency.
pronounced decline in land prices after 1990.12 Therefore, they may have triggered
relatively more land-use conversion from commercial to residential construction and
increased more of the residential population, as we hypothesized.
Municipality-level daytime population data are only available for the Tokyo and
Osaka prefectures. Regarding the other prefectures that are not the core of a large MA,
the daytime population and nighttime population are less disparate and not reported
in the relevant prefectural statistical yearbook. Therefore, our estimations cover 49 (56)
urban municipalities of the Tokyo (Osaka) prefecture, 23 (24) of which constitute the
city of Tokyo (Osaka).
Our first regression models the link between the annualized rate of residential
population growth during the 1990–2015 period in municipality i (the left-hand-side
(LHS) variable), which is expressed as a percentage, and its NDPR in 1990 (the right-
hand-side (RHS) variable):
ln(Pop2015i )− ln(Pop
1990
i )
25
× 100 = α+ βNDPRi,1990 + ǫi. (1)
The estimated β, as presented in column 1 of the Table 1 (panel A for the Tokyo
prefecture and panel B for the Osaka prefecture), demonstrates our hypothesis, which
is negative and statistically significant. The summary statistics of the variables used
in the regressions are shown in panel A of Table A1. We can interpret the result for
Tokyo as follow. A one standard deviation decrease in NDPR in 1990 (0.354) implies
12In municipalities where the existence of factories mainly dominate lands, the residential population
would also be much smaller than the daytime population (people at their workplace). Hence, a lower
NDPR is not related to a higher dominance of commercial land use, thereby causing a measurement
problem. However, within our sample, all municipalities with a low NDPR are in the central locations of
the Tokyo and Osaka MAs, where the number of factories is minimal.
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an increase in annualized population growth for the next 25 years equal to nearly half
of mean growth rate (0.6%). To relieve the limitations arising from a small number
of observations, the significance of using bootstrapped standard errors (500 bootstrap
repetitions) is also reported (in bracket). The results are largely consistent.
We then address the issues of omitted variables. Municipalities with a lower NDPR
tend to be closer to the CBD and have a higher initial residential density. These
inherent heterogeneities are likely to influence commercial-residential segregation and
population growth simultaneously after the bubble burst. In columns 2 and 3 of Table
1, by replacing the independent variable with geographic distance from the Tokyo
(Osaka) station (a proxy for the proximity to the CBD) and population density in
1990, respectively, we find that these two factors are significantly correlated with the
post-1990 population growth in the Tokyo prefecture (the coefficients for Osaka are
insignificant). However, the reported R-squared is much smaller in columns 2 and 3
than that in column 1 (0.056 and 0.081 vs. 0.325 for Tokyo; 0.018 and 0.005 vs. 0.421
for Osaka), which suggests that NDPR is more persuasive as a determinant of the
post-1990 population growth, than the other two factors. Adding these two controls
into Eq. 1, NDPR in 1990 is still significantly correlated with the population growth in
the 1990–2015 period (column 4 of Table 1).
Our point of view is further validated by a subsample regression using only the
municipality-level wards in the cities of Tokyo and Osaka. Using this sub-sample, we
can deal with the issue that some peripheral municipalities in the prefecture are not
in the commuting zone of the central city, and their NDPR and population growth are
likely to be affected by unobservable factors that are not included in the regression. The
results for this subsample, which are shown in column 5, are essentially unchanged.
We also conduct a test using population growth from 1980 to 1990 as the LHS variable
in column 6. In this regression, NDPR in 1980 is considered the independent variable.
The estimated coefficient shows that they are positively correlated. The residential
population in the municipalities with a low NDPR—commercial use dominated land
development—shrank during the real estate bubble, which is consistent with the
stylized facts we discussed earlier.
4.2 Within estimator
We then check the robustness of our results by employing a within (fixed effects)
municipality estimator over time. The data we use here is slightly different from those
used in the cross-section regression. First, we extend the sample in some specifications,
which covers all urbanmunicipalities of the Tokyo andOsakaMAs and avoids the latent
selection bias that results from using only data of the Tokyo and Osaka prefectures.
Second, our municipality sample covers 23 years (1980–2003); data after 2003 are
excluded. This exclusion is because Japan underwent a nationwide municipality
consolidation in the 2000s (mainly implemented in the 2003–2006 period), resulting
in economic and demographic data in many municipalities that are incomparable
before and after this event. This boundary adjustment did not affect the Tokyo and
Osaka prefectures. Since the sharp fluctuations in land prices mainly occurred in the
1985-1995 period, we expect that the missing recent data (after 2003) will not affect the
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interpretation of our results.
As shown in Eq. 2, we set the LHS variable as population growth rate inmunicipality
i in year t; PopGi,t = (ln(Popi,t)− ln(Popi,t−1))× 100. For the RHS, we include a set of
interaction terms between a dummy variable indicating municipalities whose NDPR in
1990 are smaller than 0.8, and period dummy variables (Pa; a = 1 through 4) for the
four periods (1985–1990, 1990–1995, 1995–2000, and 2000–2003; the 1980–1985 period is
set as the benchmark):
PopGi,t = α+
4
∑
a=1
βaD[NDPRi,1990 < 0.8]× P
a
t + γi + σt + ǫi,t. (2)
Our key coefficients of interest are βa, which capture the treatment effect of the bubble
and its burst on the relative population growth of the central locations (with a low
NDPR) and the non-central area (the remaining municipalities in the Tokyo and Osaka
prefectures); the latter is taken as the comparison group because its land prices and
land-use patterns were relatively stable during the bubble economy. γ and σ capture
municipality and year fixed effects, respectively. The former controls for all time-
invariant differences between municipalities while the latter controls for time-variant
changes that similarly affect all municipalities, such as a negative income shock due to
the bubble burst. α is the constant term and ǫ stands for the error term.
The estimation results of Eq. 2 are presented in columns 1 and 2 of Table 2 for
the Tokyo and Osaka prefectures, respectively; summary statistics are presented in
panel B of Table A1. Taking the Tokyo prefecture as an example, the annual population
growth rate during the bubble period (1985–1990) in the group with a low NDPR is 1.5
percentage points lower than that in the remaining sample areas. Meanwhile, shortly
after the bubble burst, the estimated coefficients became significantly positive. These
results coincide with the cross-section estimates, as shown in Table 1. The pattern of
changes in the key coefficients for the Osaka prefecture is similar.
We next checked for the robustness of this association to alternatively measuring
the extent of commercial-residential segregation based on a set of dummy variables.
According to Figure 9 (right panel), the more central the location is, the lower the
NDPR, that is, the more evident the commercial-residential segregation. The specific
hierarchy of centrality a municipality belongs to is, therefore, used to proxy the degree
of land-use segregation. Using this measurement approach, we can extend our analysis
to all urban municipalities in the Tokyo and Osaka MAs. Considering the Tokyo MA as
an example, our regression takes the following form:
PopGi,t = α+
4
∑
a=1
βaC3i × P
a
t +
4
∑
a=1
φaC8i × P
a
t +
4
∑
a=1
ψaCCi × P
a
t + γi + σt + ǫi,t, (3)
where C3 is a dummy variable taking the value of one for the three central wards of
Tokyo and zero otherwise; C8 is a dummy variable that is equal to one for the remaining
five of the eight central wards of Tokyo (excluding the three central wards); and CC
is a dummy variable denoting the remaining 15 wards of the city of Tokyo (excluding
its eight central wards). The peripheral Tokyo MA municipalities that are outside
the Tokyo city are set as the comparison. Other variables are the same as in Eq. 2.
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Regarding the Osaka MA, C3 refers to the three central wards of Osaka city and CC
denotes its remaining 21 wards; C8 does not apply in the case of Osaka.
The estimation results are presented in columns 3 and 4 of Table 2 for the Tokyo and
Osaka MAs, respectively. In column 3, we find that the annual population growth rate
during the bubble period (1985–1990) in C3 is 2.1 percentage points lower than that
in the peripheral areas of the Tokyo MA, while C8 and CC are 1.2 and 0.6 percentage
points lower, respectively (as a reference, the sample mean of the annual population
growth rate is 0.7%). The more central the municipality, the lower the population
growth rate. Then, shortly after the bubble burst, we find that the estimated coefficients
became significantly positive. In the 1995–2000 period, C3’s annual population growth
is 3.1 percentage points higher, followed by C8 of 1.4 percentage points and CC of 1.1.
The pattern for the Osaka MA is again similar, although decentralization during the
1985–1990 period was observed in its C3 only.
A potential issue of the above estimates is the preexisting trends for population
growth before the bubble boom. The municipality-level data series are not available
before 1980, we therefore construct the pre-trends by using prefecture-level data. We
first use prefecture-level data from 1970 to 1980 to construct a linear projection of the
population growth rate in the 1980–2003 period for each sample prefecture. Next, the
original municipality population data are detrended by subtracting them from the
prefecture-level pre-1980 trends. By including the prefecture-specific linear trends,
we find the patterns remained, as shown in columns 5–6; note that the estimated
coefficients after 1995 become larger.
To examine the mechanism that post-1990 central city population growth was
affected by the housing construction boom after the bubble burst, we re-estimate
Eq. 2 and Eq. 3 by replacing the LHS variable with the housing starts (in m2) per
capita. Results, as shown in Table 3, imply that the changes in the intensity of housing
development coincides with that in population growth; central locations had relatively
lower (higher) housing construction intensity during the bubble period (after the bubble
burst). For example, according to column 3, Tokyo C3’s annual housing starts per capita
in the 1995–2000 period are 1.6 m2 larger than the comparison group, equal to nearly
150% of the sample mean (1.1 m2); for C8 and CC, the estimated effects equal to 27%
and 16%, respectively.
To further explore the robustness of the baseline results, we examine many alter-
native specifications and samples, which are discussed in detail below. First, we add
control variables to mitigate omitted variable problems. The area of all parks in a
municipality, number of criminal offenses perceived, number of hospitals or clinics,
and gender balance of the residential population are included for measuring amenity,
public security, provision of public facilities, and demographic structure, respectively,
which are expected to be associated with the residential location choice. Columns 1
and 2 of Table 4 report the related results for Tokyo and Osaka, respectively, which are
largely consistent with our previous estimates, although the number of observations is
less by about half. To ensure that the estimated results are not subject to the changes
in sample size, we re-estimate our baseline regression model (Eq. 3) with the reduced
sample size. The results, as shown in columns 3 and 4, do not appear to be significantly
changed.
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Second, our results are robust to the exclusion of the remote peripheral municipali-
ties. As shown in Figure 2, the remote peripheral municipalities of the Tokyo and Osaka
MAs are less populated; they are relatively extraneous regarding gentrification and
commuter behavior in central cities. By excluding the Tokyo (Osaka) MAmunicipalities
that are 30 km or further away from the Tokyo (Osaka) station, the positive impact on
central locations during 1995 and 2003 remains, as presented in column 5 (6) of Table 4.
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Figure 10: Year-by-year estimates.
Notes: The dashed lines are the 95% confidence interval. Population growth in the 1980–1982 period is
set as the benchmark. "central 8_Tokyo (C3 excl.)" refers to the eight central wards of Tokyo, excluding
the three central wards. "the city of Tokyo (C8 excl.)" refers to the city of Tokyo, excluding its eight central
wards. "the city of Osaka (C3 excl.)" refers to the city of Osaka, excluding the three central wards.
To more accurately identify heterogeneity over time in the changes of population
growth dynamics, we further introduce an augmented version of Eq. 3 by replacing Pat
with a set of individual year dummies timeat ; time
a
t takes the value of one if a = t and
zero otherwise.
PopGi,t = α+
2003
∑
a=1983
β1,aC3i × time
a
t +
2003
∑
a=1983
β2,aC8i × time
a
t +
2003
∑
a=1983
β3,aCCi × time
a
t
+γi + σt + ǫi,t,
(4)
where the population growth in the 1980–1982 period is taken as the benchmark. Other
terms are the same as those in Eq. 3. Plots a, b, and c of Figure 10 display the estimated
interaction term coefficients β1,a, β2,a, and β3,a, respectively, for the Tokyo MA; d and
e refer to the related estimates for the Osaka MA. Within the 1985–1990 period, the
estimated β are significantly negative for the central locations of Tokyo and Osaka.
After that, they become positive, and the magnitude increases monotonically over time
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(plots a, b, and d). The time point of dynamic changes of population growth coincides
with that of land prices; that is, the CBDs were relatively slower in population growth
before 1990, but became faster after the bubble burst. Patterns shown in plots c and e
are also in line with our point of view, although they are statistically less significant.
4.3 Is the gentrification the cause, not the effect, of the housing boom?
We are concerned about the issue of reverse causality; that is, whether the housing
boom led by the changes in the land-use pattern in central cities was simply the result of
population growth there. However, it is hard to hold this view because the population
influx occurred after, not before, the housing construction boom. According to Figure 6,
the housing boom in central cities started to intensify during the 1993–1995 period (we
will further present the number of housing starts by housing type in Section 5, where it
will be clearer that the central city housing boom has started in the 1993–1995 period).
However, population growth there was not significant until 2000 (Figure 8).
To formally examine the causal relationship between housing starts and population
growth, we employ a simple regression model (Eq. 5) by taking the population growth
rate of municipality i in year t as the dependent variable and the intensity of housing
starts in the previous years, measured by the average of the housing starts in m2 per
capita (HS) in years t− 3, t− 2, and t− 1, as the RHS variable (a time lag exists since
housing investment and construction take a certain time):
PopGi,t = α+ β1
t−1
∑
a=t−3
1
3
HSi,a + ǫi. (5)
If population growth in the central cities was boosted by housing capital investment, we
expect β1 to be positive. Since the extra population growth after the bubble burst was
mainly concentrated in the central cities, our regression analysis only focuses on the 23
and 24 wards of the Tokyo and Osaka cities, respectively. We regress each year’s data
separately; summary statistics are shown in panel C of Table A1. Due to a small number
of observations, we report bootstrapped standard errors (500 bootstrap repetitions).
Column 1 of Table 5 presents the estimated β1, by year, for Tokyo (each regression has
23 observations), we find that the estimated coefficients are positive and statistically
significant for most years since 1994. That is, the population growth rate of 1994 was
positively associated with the intensity of housing starts in the previous three years
(1990–1993), which were immediately after the bubble burst. Moreover, this positive
correlation remained for the subsequent decade.
As a robustness test, we exchange the LHS and RHS variables of Eq. 5, and estimate
the following equation:
HSi,t = α+ β2
t−1
∑
a=t−3
1
3
PopGi,a + ǫi, (6)
where the significance of β2 examines whether past population growth affects the
current housing construction intensity in a municipality. For instance, in the case where
β2 is significant for 1994, it implies that population growth in the previous three years
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(1990–1993) affected the number of housing starts in 1994. If the reverse causality exists,
β2 will be significantly positive; however, column 2 shows that this coefficient is not
significant in most years, whether before or after 1990. This result implies that housing
starts after the bubble burst drove population growth in Tokyo city, not the reverse.
Note that results for the 1984–1993 period are insignificant for most regression tests
of Eq. 5 (column 1) and Eq. 6 (column 2). This result is reasonable because there were
intense land price fluctuations in this period; thus, housing development was compre-
hensively restrained in the central cities (see Figures 5–7), making it less correlated with
the population growth. Moreover, β2 is significantly positive for 2002 and 2003 (column
2); this is also not contradictory to our results. Taking the positive correlation between
PopG1998−2001 and HS2002 as an example, PopG2001 is positively affected by HS1997−2000
according to the estimates of Eq. 4 (column 1 of Table 4); the latter is, however, likely to
be positively associated with HS2002 due to the inertia of population growth. Therefore,
PopG2001 and HS2002 are not necessary to be uninfluential to each other. Analogously, it
is also possible for PopG1999 and PopG2000 to be associated with HS2002 via HS1995−1998
and HS1996−1999, respectively.
Results using data of Osaka are largely consistent. As exhibited in column 3 of Table
5, lagged HS can well predict PopG after 1993, while the correlation between lagged
PopG and HS (Eq. 6) is not significant until 1998 (column 4). These simple tests provide
evidence against the argument that the central city housing boom was simply the result
of residential recentralization (gentrification).
4.4 Are condominiums in the central city becoming relatively cheaper?
Another argument against our hypothesis would be that the prevalence of high-rise
buildings in recent decades promotes the advances in construction technology, thereby
reducing the construction costs of high-rise condominium towers and making it rel-
atively cheaper. Since the central city is the most suitable place to build such homes,
advances in construction technology might have reduced the cost of buying a house
there. One may expect that gentrification would still happen even without the burst
of the real estate bubble. Moreover, high-rise condominiums are much more intensive
in land use (higher in the floor-to-area ratio) than detached houses, which also allows
homebuyers to incur a relatively lower costs for owning a home.13
However, we find this is not the case by checking the price changes in new con-
dominium. Figure 11 displays the prices of residential land and new condominium
for the Tokyo and Osaka MAs in the 1990–2017 period (data for the earlier years are
not available). During the 1990–1995 period (immediately after the bubble burst), the
prices for both condominium and residential land declined significantly compared
to their price peaks. However, the price changes began to diverge after 1995, with
condominium prices stabilizing, and then rebounding, whereas residential land prices
declined continuously.14 Obviously, condominium, whose construction is more inten-
13A condominium is on average smaller than a detached house, which further makes it relatively
affordable.
14Note that the price index of new condominiums, as shown in Figure 11, does not consider the
potential changes in average dwelling size. By considering the price per m2, we find that the patterns
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Figure 11: Residential land and condominium prices in the Tokyo and Osaka MAs.
Notes: Data are obtained from the Japanese Real Estate Statistics 2019, released by the Mitsui Fudosan
Co.,Ltd. (Planning and Research Department). Data of new condominium (residential land) price index
at the MA-level are available in the 1991–2017 (1990–2017) period.
sive in land use, did not become relatively cheaper than residential land (or detached
house; the changes in price index for residential land and detached house are similar).
Instead, they have become increasingly expensive.
Although it is beyond the scope of the current study, we propose a potential expla-
nation for the diverged relative prices between residential land and new condominium.
To construct high-rise condominiums, land developers are subject to the issue of land
assembly, which is costly. Brooks and Lutz (2016) and Yamasaki et al. (2020) find
that a large residential plot (or a to-be-assembled land parcel) trades at a significant
premium in Los Angeles and Tokyo, respectively. Since most of the residential land
transactions in the MAwere for small plots (less than 200m2), which are applicable only
for detached house construction, the reported residential land price index—calculated
based on the average unit price for all land transactions—mainly reflects the price of
small plots, and cannot precisely reflect the costs of assembled land parcels. The latter
is, however, relatively more relevant to the price of condominiums.
4.5 Other contributing factors
Aside from the mechanisms we introduced, other factors could potentially account for
our findings. We present several pieces of additional evidence that gentrification in the
central city areas was driven by the land price fluctuations and land-use conversion,
rather than by these alternative explanations.
First, advances in internal transportation facilities could play a role in reshaping
are largely similar; the unit price of a new (existing) condominium increased by 57% (54%) during the
2005–2017 period in the Tokyo MA (Global Property Guide, 2019).
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urban spatial structure (Baum-Snow, 2007; Li and Xu, 2018). By checking the new starts
and upgrades of major transportation infrastructures in Tokyo and Osaka, however,
we find that both interregional (high-speed railroads and expressways) and the in-
traregional (city roads and urban rail transits) facilities currently in operation began
operations before 1985. We have not found substantial development in this regard.
Therefore, it is less likely to have motivated the post-1990 gentrification in Tokyo and
Osaka.
Second, government policies on land-use regulation or zoning may be associated
with city structure and variation of housing vacancies (Cheshire et al., 2018). There-
fore, it affects the interpretation of our results. The Obuchi (1998–2000) and Koizumi
Cabinet (2001–2006) treated urban regeneration as a way for large cities to regain their
competitiveness and address the recession after the bubble burst (Hirayama, 2017).
Thus, policies, including the deregulation of urban planning, have been implemented
since 1998. However, these policies favoring central city regeneration and the trends of
"Recentralization of Central City (Toshin-Kaiki in Japanese)" did not make substantial
progress until the late 1990s, whereas the housing construction boom in the central
cities began in the early 1990s. Therefore, it is safe to say that the observed central city
housing boom was not triggered by government policies, although they might have
pushed it forward to some extent.
Moreover, public housing policy may affect the intra-city neighborhood changes
as well (Tach and Emory, 2017). As discussed in Xu and Zhou (2019), public housing
in the major cities of Japan was mainly built before 1980. Since then, the main effort
on public housing was to maintain the existing buildings. Since the vacancy rate of
public housing in Tokyo and Osaka has been extremely low in recent decades, and
the economic composition of tenants has been stable over time (Xu and Zhou, 2019),
it is evident that the maintenance of public housing is powerless to accommodate the
sharply growing population in the central city areas since the early 1990s.
5 Gentrification and central city housing structure
As an extension to our empirical results, we further examine whether land price
fluctuations and gentrification have structurally changed the housing supply in the
central cities, which will be informative to the decision-making on housing and zoning-
related policies. We find that houses in the central cities are more likely to be in the
form of high-rise condominiums and larger in floor area after the bubble burst.
5.1 A growing number of high-rise residential buildings
To be consistent with our hypothesis that the land-use conversion in central cities
triggered gentrification, we expect that a large number of high-rise condominiums have
been constructed there.15 By contrast, the new construction of high-rise commercial
and office buildings is expected to have declined relatively.
15Even if land prices fell a lot after the bubble burst, land in the CBDs is still too expensive to use for
detached houses.
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Table 6 displays the housing stock of Tokyo city and Osaka city. During the 1998–
2013 period (data for the earlier years are not available), housing stock increased by
33% (22%) in Tokyo (Osaka) city, which is much more significant than its growth in
residential population in the same period (12% for Tokyo and 3% for Osaka).16 It is
noteworthy that condominiums in buildings with six or more stories have been the
biggest contributor to the new housing supply after 1998, among which the increase in
the number of dwellings in the buildings of 15 or more stories was the most significant.
Table 7 further displays the stock and locations of the Tokyo prefecture’s high-rise
buildings (detailed data for other prefectures are not available) in the 1980–2010 period.
The number of high-rise buildings has increased dramatically in these three decades;
those of nine or more stories increased by 349%, and those with 13 or more stories
increased by 702%. Although the number of high-rise buildings in peripheral areas (i.e.,
areas outside the city of Tokyo) has also been growing, 54% of the high-rise buildings
are still in the eight central wards of Tokyo in 2010, which account for only 6.2% of the
prefecture’s land area; 91% are in the city of Tokyo. Regarding the new construction
of buildings with 30 or more stories in this period, 77% (97%) are located in the eight
central wards (the city of Tokyo). This pattern implies that the development of high-rise
buildings in our study period has been concentrated in the central locations, which is
consistent with the facts of gentrification.
Consistently, we find that the more central the location, the higher the proportion of
residents living in high-rise buildings. According to the National Population Census
2015, for Chiyoda, Chuo, and Minato (the three central wards of Tokyo), 50%, 64%, and
46% of households, respectively, lived in buildings with 11 or more stories (longitudinal
data are not available for this indicator). Regarding the remaining five of the eight
central wards, this figure is slightly lower, ranging between 21% and 47%, which is still
much higher than the average of the entire city of Tokyo (16%). This ratio for the areas
outside Tokyo city is further lower, and the pattern for Osaka is similar.
The growth of high-rise buildings, as mentioned in Table 7, does not differentiate
between the use of buildings (commercial or residential). We pay more attention to
the latter because, according to our hypothesis, the former should have been relatively
reduced due to land-use conversion. Table 8 gives evidence of our hypothesis by
demonstrating that an increasing proportion of the super high-rise buildings (60 meters
or higher) in the Tokyo prefecture (data for the Osaka prefecture are not public) are
used for residential rather than for commercial purposes. Regarding the super high-
rise buildings constructed during the bubble period (some of them completed in the
1990–1994 period, since the construction takes a few years to complete), approximately
15% were exclusively for residential use, and approximately 60% were for commercial
and office use (the rest exhibited a combination of commercial and residential use).
However, in the following decades, an increasing number of super high-rise buildings
were constructed for residential use, whereas the share of buildings exclusively for
commercial and office use was condensed. The latter coincides with the facts that the
central city daytime population has declined after the bubble burst, as presented in
Figure 9.
16Since housing construction takes a certain time, housing stock in 1998 only contains a small percent-
age of houses built after the bubble burst.
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Although seemingly fragmented, the discussion above can partially verify that, after
the bubble burst, land development in the central locations was increasingly focused on
high-rise condominiums, which absorbed the post-1990 inflow of residents. Note that,
since the reported figures in Tables 6–8 are obtained from different raw data sources,
and data availability is limited, they differ in the definition of high-rise buildings (Table
6 (7) refers to the buildings with six (nine) or more stories, and Table 8 denotes the
buildings with 60 meters or more in height) and the geographic boundary of the sample
area (Table 6 refers to the cities of Tokyo and Osaka, and Tables 7 and 8 refer to the
Tokyo prefecture). However, we can ensure that the reliability of the above discussion
will not be essentially undermined since all the stylized facts are compatible with each
other.
5.2 Houses are on average larger
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Figure 12: The average floor area of housing starts.
Notes: The reported figures refer to the municipality mean by year. See data sources in Table A1.
The structure of housing starts has changed substantially after the bubble burst.
Figure 12 shows the average floor area of all housings starts in the Tokyo (Osaka)
MA and the city of Tokyo (Osaka); they firstly declined in the late 1980s and then
increased with the burst of the real estate bubble. Figure 13 further shows the number
of housing starts in the Tokyo and Osaka MAs and their central cities, by separating
the "built-to-sell" dwellings (mainly condominiums) and "built-to-rent" ones (mainly
single-bedroom apartments).17 Note that there are substantial differences between
17There are other types of housing construction (though limited), such as owner-occupied homes
built by the landowners and issued houses for employees built by the employers; "built-to-sell" and
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the two types of housing: "built-to-sell" dwellings (70–100 m2 on average) are larger
than "built-to-rent" ones (40–60 m2), although they are all smaller than owner-occupied
houses (110–140 m2) (see Figure 14).
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Figure 13: Number of housing starts, by house type.
Notes: See data sources in Table A1. Data for 2007 are missing.
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Figure 14: The average floor area of the three types of houses.
Notes: See data sources in Table A1.
The proportion of "built-to-rent" dwellings peaked during the bubble period. This
result may be because the house price is too high for most people to afford large-
sized homes. After the bubble burst, with the improving housing affordability, land
"built-to-rent" dwellings account for, on average, 70% of the Tokyo and Osaka MAs’ new housing supply
in the 1980–2017 period (the more recent the year, the higher the proportion). Regarding the Tokyo and
Osaka cities, this proportion has stabilized above 80%.
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developers began to build larger dwellings in central cities, targeting those who can
afford the central city property. Thus, "built-to-sell" dwellings have been dominant
since the early 1990s.
Moreover, we find that the more central the locations, the more significant the
changes in the average dwelling size of housing starts during and after the bubble
economy. By replacing the LHS variable of Eq. 3 with the ratio of "built-to-sell"
dwellings in total housing starts, we find that this figure declined in the central cities
during the bubble period. However, the pattern was reversed after the bubble burst
(columns 1 and 2 of Table 9 for Tokyo and Osaka, respectively). To avoid the bias from
the changes in the starts of owner-occupied homes that are built by the landowner,
which are less market-driven, we replace the LHS variable with the proportion of
the "built-to-sell" in the sum of "built-to-sell" and "built-to-rent" dwellings (real estate
developers built both); the results remained the same (columns 3–4). This changing
housing development strategy is consistent with the increasing population and the
increasing income level of residents in the central cities accompanied by gentrification.
This trend in housing development strategy was, however, not nationwide. By
examining the changes in the share of "built-to-sell" dwellings in the sum of "built-to-
sell" and "built-to-rent" dwellings, we find that prefectures in the Tokyo and Osaka
MAs are the main areas that exhibit the trend of shifting from the development of
"built-to-rent" toward "built-to-sell" dwellings (Table 10). This proportion increased
by 30 and 11 percentage points, respectively, in the Tokyo and Osaka MAs, but it is
basically unchanged in the remaining prefectures. This result implies that the trend of
housing investment transformation that occurred in the Tokyo and Osaka MAs was
not caused by factors, such as the changes in national building standards, taxes, and
residents’ preferences; otherwise, other prefectures should show similar patterns.
6 Concluding remarks
We identify a new supply-side cause of gentrification by studying the effects of a real
estate bubble and its burst on the intra-MA residential location choice in the Tokyo
and Osaka MAs. In response to the land price fluctuations in the central cities, land
developers tend to increase (decrease) housing construction and decrease (increase)
commercial development when land prices fall (rise). This situation will increase
(decrease) the supply of decent homes in central cities and encourage gentrification
(suburbanization). The endogenous changes in land development strategy will affect a
city’s residential location and spatial structure.
From a policy perspective, such a possibility provides a rationale for government
interventions, such as land-use regulation to encourage (or suppress) market-led land-
use conversion in the central cities. The results also suggest that the effect of exogenous
land price fluctuations on land-use conversion should be considered in housing and
zoning policy formulation to avoid policy ineffectiveness. It is worth emphasizing
that, due to the limitations on data availability, our analysis of land-use conversion
and resident income changes in the central cities is qualitative rather than quantitative,
which makes our mechanism analysis potentially less reliable.
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Table 1: Commercial-residential segregation during the bubble period and population
growth after the bubble burst.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Annualized pop. growth rate (%)
1990–2015 1980–90
Panel A Tokyo prefecture
NDPR1990 -0.811 -0.473 -0.589
(0.293) (0.244) (0.341)
[0.294] [0.226] [0.344]
ln(Pop. density1990) -0.183 -0.539 -0.786
(0.110) (0.167) (0.347)
[0.124] [0.189] [0.407]
Dist. Tokyo Station -0.011 -0.023 -0.014 0.038
(0.006) (0.007) (0.026) (0.015)
[0.006] [0.008] [0.028] [0.016]
NDPR1980 2.241
(0.394)
[0.403]
ln(Pop. density1980) -0.452
(0.289)
[0.307]
N 49 49 49 49 23 49
R2 0.325 0.056 0.081 0.524 0.658 0.787
Panel B Osaka prefecture
NDPR1990 -1.465 -1.871 -2.560
(0.235) (0.242) (0.433)
[0.278] [0.272] [0.439]
ln(Pop. density1990) -0.107 -0.338 0.293
(0.084) (0.147) (0.262)
[0.083] [0.142] [0.339]
Dist. Osaka Station -0.004 0.002 0.011 -0.036
(0.008) (0.012) (0.041) (0.026)
[0.009] [0.012] [0.042] [0.025]
NDPR1980 0.721
(0.588)
[0.580]
ln(Pop. density1980) -1.021
(0.235)
[0.230]
N 56 56 56 56 24 56
R2 0.421 0.018 0.005 0.593 0.808 0.495
Notes: NDPR: Nighttime-to-daytime population ratio. The constant term coefficients are not reported.
Robust standard errors are given in parentheses. To relieve the limitations arising from a small number
of observations, the significance using bootstrapped standard errors (500 bootstrap repetitions) is also
reported (in bracket).
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Table 2: Baseline estimation results.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Pop. growth rate (%)
Tokyo pref. Osaka pref. Tokyo MA Osaka MA Tokyo MA Osaka MA
[NDPR1990 < 0.8] × yr 85–90 -1.492 -0.122
(0.265) (0.415)
× yr 90–95 -0.099 0.069
(0.216) (0.310)
× yr 95–00 1.556 1.245
(0.374) (0.309)
× yr 00–03 2.118 2.520
(0.513) (0.504)
C3 × yr 85–90 -2.050 -1.014 -1.542 -0.641
(0.291) (0.255) (0.294) (0.256)
× yr 90–95 0.206 -0.200 1.235 0.544
(0.248) (0.411) (0.261) (0.414)
× yr 95–00 3.129 1.494 4.699 2.605
(0.455) (0.409) (0.469) (0.417)
× yr 00–03 4.650 3.184 6.689 4.588
(0.514) (0.950) (0.533) (0.955)
C8 × yr 85–90 -1.196 -0.688
(0.302) (0.306)
× yr 90–95 -0.301 0.728
(0.358) (0.367)
× yr 95–00 1.420 2.990
(0.264) (0.288)
× yr 00–03 2.181 4.219
(0.225) (0.266)
CC × yr 85–90 -0.584 0.425 -0.076 0.798
(0.248) (0.211) (0.252) (0.212)
× yr 90–95 0.081 0.358 1.110 1.103
(0.144) (0.258) (0.166) (0.264)
× yr 95–00 1.134 0.566 2.704 1.676
(0.159) (0.279) (0.196) (0.290)
× yr 00–03 1.352 1.104 3.391 2.509
(0.155) (0.311) (0.209) (0.328)
two-way FEs Y Y Y Y Y Y
de-trend N N N N Y Y
N 1,133 1,270 3,690 2,806 3,690 2,806
R2 0.413 0.204 0.329 0.085 0.679 0.536
Notes: NDPR: Nighttime-to-daytime population ratio. There are nine municipalities in the Tokyo
prefecture with NDPR smaller than 0.8 (column 1); this figure for the Osaka prefecture is seven (column
2). C3: the three central wards of Tokyo/Osaka city; C8: the eight central wards of Tokyo city, by
excluding the three central wards; CC: the city of Tokyo (excluding the eight central wards), or the city of
Osaka (excluding the three central wards). Constant term coefficients are not reported. Heteroskedasticity
robust standard errors (clustered at the municipality level) in parentheses.
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Table 3: Examining the changes in the intensity of housing construction.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Housing starts per capita
Tokyo prefecture Osaka prefecture Tokyo MA Osaka MA
[NDPR1990 < 0.8] × yr 85–90 -0.115 -0.222
(0.105) (0.136)
× yr 90–95 -0.275 -0.566
(0.096) (0.169)
× yr 95–00 0.639 0.045
(0.236) (0.065)
× yr 00–03 1.338 0.701
(0.547) (0.229)
C3 × yr 85–90 -0.097 -0.595
(0.277) (0.094)
× yr 90–95 -0.273 -1.033
(0.245) (0.200)
× yr 95–00 1.638 0.021
(0.222) (0.085)
× yr 00–03 3.663 0.961
(0.583) (0.404)
C8 × yr 85–90 -0.129
(0.079)
× yr 90–95 -0.207
(0.046)
× yr 95–00 0.288
(0.063)
× yr 00–03 0.470
(0.144)
CC × yr 85–90 0.032 -0.039
(0.044) (0.064)
× yr 90–95 -0.083 -0.240
(0.042) (0.064)
× yr 95–00 0.174 -0.046
(0.054) (0.070)
× yr 00–03 0.299 0.206
(0.048) (0.095)
two-way FEs Y Y Y Y
N 1,185 1,326 3,876 2,931
R2 0.303 0.272 0.335 0.202
Notes: NDPR: Nighttime-to-daytime population ratio. There are nine municipalities in Tokyo prefecture
with NDPR smaller than 0.8 (column 1); this figure for Osaka prefecture is seven (column 2). C3: the
three central wards of Tokyo/Osaka city; C8: the eight central wards of Tokyo city, by excluding the three
central wards; CC: the city of Tokyo (excluding the eight central wards), or the city of Osaka (excluding
the three central wards). Constant term coefficients are not reported. Heteroskedasticity robust standard
errors (clustered at the municipality level) in parentheses.
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Table 4: Robustness checks.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Pop. growth rate (%)
with controls symmetry sample 30 km radius
Tokyo MA Osaka MA Tokyo MA Osaka MA Tokyo MA Osaka MA
C3 × yr 85–90 -1.907 -1.289 -1.901 -1.281 -2.039 -0.932
(0.462) (0.301) (0.452) (0.308) (0.310) (0.242)
× yr 90–95 -0.692 -0.374 -0.735 -0.402 0.333 0.155
(0.725) (0.249) (0.703) (0.237) (0.279) (0.426)
× yr 95–00 3.271 1.429 3.129 1.397 2.833 1.564
(0.519) (0.309) (0.408) (0.293) (0.478) (0.433)
× yr 00–03 4.891 3.134 4.754 3.092 4.248 3.249
(0.795) (0.838) (0.719) (0.816) (0.539) (0.965)
C8 × yr 85–90 -0.683 -0.673 -1.185
(0.199) (0.199) (0.321)
× yr 90–95 -0.203 -0.187 -0.174
(0.354) (0.357) (0.381)
× yr 95–00 1.818 1.828 1.124
(0.232) (0.227) (0.299)
× yr 00–03 2.566 2.584 1.779
(0.248) (0.239) (0.271)
CC × yr 85–90 -0.519 0.394 -0.523 0.393 -0.573 0.508
(0.259) (0.253) (0.257) (0.254) (0.270) (0.195)
× yr 90–95 0.083 0.159 0.067 0.165 0.209 0.714
(0.213) (0.273) (0.205) (0.275) (0.191) (0.279)
× yr 95–00 1.405 0.537 1.382 0.527 0.838 0.636
(0.216) (0.297) (0.195) (0.300) (0.210) (0.310)
× yr 00–03 1.772 1.374 1.734 1.369 0.951 1.169
(0.253) (0.327) (0.215) (0.327) (0.215) (0.335)
two-way FEs Y Y Y Y Y Y
N 1,913 1,712 1,913 1,712 1,870 1,552
R2 0.404 0.137 0.403 0.134 0.358 0.168
Notes: C3: the three central wards of Tokyo/Osaka city; C8: the eight central wards of Tokyo city, by
excluding the three central wards; CC: the city of Tokyo (excluding the eight central wards), or the city of
Osaka (excluding the three central wards). For columns 1–2, control variables include: ln(area of parks+1),
ln(number of hospitals+1), ln(number of clinics+1), ln(number of criminal offenses perceived+1), and the
absolute value of (female pop./pop.−0.5). Constant term coefficients are not reported. Heteroskedasticity
robust standard errors (clustered at the municipality level) in parentheses.
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Table 5: Testing the reverse causality.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Specification Eq. 5 Eq. 6 Eq. 5 Eq. 6
# LHS variable PopGt HSt PopGt HSt
# RHS variable HSMeanLag3 PopGMeanLag3 HSMeanLag3 PopGMeanLag3
the city of Tokyo the city of Tokyo the city of Osaka the city of Osaka
Year t= coeff. s.e. coeff. s.e. coeff. s.e. coeff. s.e.
1984 -0.106 [0.992] -0.003 [0.063] 1.260 [0.691] 0.025 [0.079]
1985 -2.222 [1.574] -0.005 [0.054] 0.581 [0.755] 0.027 [0.108]
1986 -3.446 [1.674] -0.068 [0.050] 0.392 [0.627] -0.006 [0.084]
1987 -5.683 [2.980] 0.010 [0.040] -0.635 [0.760] -0.056 [0.064]
1988 -1.785 [2.033] -0.058 [0.054] -0.775 [0.435] -0.098 [0.115]
1989 -0.814 [1.402] -0.020 [0.045] -0.472 [0.812] -0.124 [0.094]
1990 0.362 [1.179] -0.059 [0.061] 0.966 [1.563] -0.147 [0.071]
1991 0.215 [1.634] 0.028 [0.036] -0.008 [0.736] -0.010 [0.072]
1992 0.572 [1.203] -0.004 [0.075] 0.298 [0.543] 0.067 [0.042]
1993 1.606 [1.154] 0.015 [0.049] 0.902 [0.645] -0.004 [0.084]
1994 2.367 [0.643] 0.068 [0.064] 1.414 [0.502] 0.008 [0.119]
1995 2.418 [0.548] -0.099 [0.081] 0.981 [0.432] -0.158 [0.156]
1996 0.840 [1.325] -0.274 [0.216] 0.938 [0.350] 0.137 [0.249]
1997 0.733 [0.299] 0.015 [0.220] 1.224 [0.232] 0.433 [0.316]
1998 1.342 [0.637] 0.200 [0.355] 1.692 [0.508] 0.554 [0.119]
1999 0.889 [0.294] 0.468 [0.503] 1.977 [0.330] 0.348 [0.172]
2000 1.056 [0.417] 0.423 [0.595] 1.567 [0.239] 0.402 [0.116]
2001 0.580 [0.396] 0.528 [0.421] 2.566 [0.294] 0.649 [0.198]
2002 0.826 [0.347] 1.966 [0.798] 1.502 [0.500] 0.634 [0.106]
2003 0.757 [0.161] 1.236 [0.757] 1.576 [0.232] 0.699 [0.137]
Notes: Each point estimate stems from a separate OLS regression (20×4=80 regression tests in total);
for columns 1–2 (3–4), each regression has 23 (24) observations, as Tokyo (Osaka) city consists of 23
(24) municipality-level wards. HSt: Housing starts (m
2) per capita in year t; PopGt: Population growth
rate (%) in year t. MeanLag3 refers to the mean of the specific variable in year t− 3, t− 2, and t− 1.
Bootstrapped standard errors (500 bootstrap repetitions) are reported (in bracket); the constant term
coefficients and R-squared are not reported.
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Table 6: Housing stock in Tokyo and Osaka.
Year Housing Detached Condominium (# stories) Tenement Others
stock house 1–5 6–10 11–14 ≥15 house
the city of Tokyo
1998 3,468.8 925.1 1,718.0 714.6 75.0 36.0
2003 3,842.4 996.6 1,747.6 565.0 368.7 73.3 68.1 23.2
2008 4,177.7 1,012.2 1,807.9 672.7 468.0 134.0 61.6 21.2
2013 4,601.6 1,060.7 1,880.9 800.8 556.0 203.2 75.8 24.1
∆1998–2013 1,132.8 135.6 162.9 845.4 0.8 -11.9
(%) (33%) (15%) (9%) (118%) (1%) (-33%)
the city of Osaka
1998 1,102.7 233.7 336.9 392.1 132.1 7.9
2003 1,186.9 298.9 314.1 259.6 172.1 49.1 88.4 4.6
2008 1,262.1 303.6 294.3 301.2 201.3 87.5 70.4 3.8
2013 1,343.2 334.1 283.3 331.4 234.4 112.8 43.7 3.4
∆1998–2013 240.5 100.4 -53.6 286.5 -88.4 -4.5
(%) (22%) (43%) (-16%) (73%) (-67%) (-57%)
Notes: Data are obtained from the Housing and Land Survey (HLS; various years). The reported
data are the number of dwellings units in thousand. Data containing detailed dwelling structure are
only available at the major city level from the HLS. The figures in the areas denoted gray refer to the
sum of condominium units in the buildings of "6–10 stories," "11–14 stories," and "15 or more stories,"
because separate data are not available for 1998. "Condominium" here also includes the small-sized
single-bedroom apartments.
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Table 7: Locations of high-rise buildings in the Tokyo prefecture.
Number of buildings Proportion
# stories # stories
Year Area 9–12 13–29 ≥30 9–12 13–29 ≥30
1980 central 3 2,095 176 40% 26%
central 8 3,476 359 66% 53%
the city of Tokyo 4,966 666 95% 99%
Tokyo prefecture 5,236 672 100% 100%
1990 central 3 3,793 287 12 36% 23% 38%
central 8 6,464 599 26 62% 49% 81%
the city of Tokyo 9,925 1,174 32 94% 96% 100%
Tokyo prefecture 10,506 1,223 32 100% 100% 100%
2000 central 3 4,854 489 34 31% 19% 39%
central 8 8,967 1,131 66 57% 45% 75%
the city of Tokyo 14,578 2,263 86 92% 90% 98%
Tokyo prefecture 15,811 2,517 88 100% 100% 100%
2010 central 3 6,023 1,090 134 28% 21% 50%
central 8 11,587 2,451 207 55% 48% 78%
the city of Tokyo 19,315 4,640 260 91% 91% 97%
Tokyo prefecture 21,157 5,121 267 100% 100% 100%
Notes: The reported data refer to the number of all high-rise buildings in the Tokyo prefecture, including
both the residential buildings and buildings for other purposes. Data are obtained from the Tokyo
Prefectural Statistical Yearbook (various years). Related data for the other prefectures in our sample
are not available. The figures in the areas denoted gray refer to the sum of the number of buildings of
"13–29" and "30 or more" stories because separate data are not available for 1980.
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Table 8: The purposes of super high-rise buildings in the Tokyo prefecture.
Number of buildings
Completion time All purposes Residential Combination of residential Commercial, office,
of the building & commercial, office and others
1980–1984 45 4 0 41
1985–1989 55 10 14 31
1990–1994 140 20 34 86
1995–1999 118 20 36 62
2000–2004 213 75 49 89
2005–2009 273 108 68 97
2010–2014 174 48 53 73
Notes: The data shown in the table refer to the building stock in 2015. Super high-rise buildings
refer to the buildings over 60 meters in height. Data are summarized based on the Annual Report of
Architectural Statistics 2016, which is released by the Tokyo Metropolitan Urban Development Bureau
(Building Planning Division, Urban Architecture Department).
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Table 9: Examining the changes in the housing structure.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
"built-to-sell"
total housing starts
"built-to-sell"
"built-to-sell"+"built-to-rent"
Tokyo MA Osaka MA Tokyo MA Osaka MA
C3 × yr 85–90 -0.278 -0.243 -0.332 -0.209
(0.037) (0.051) (0.070) (0.065)
yr 90–95 -0.201 -0.126 -0.283 -0.050
(0.024) (0.067) (0.058) (0.072)
yr 95–00 0.107 0.173 -0.038 0.194
(0.016) (0.049) (0.057) (0.062)
yr 00–03 0.169 0.188 0.020 0.189
(0.046) (0.050) (0.061) (0.060)
C8 × yr 85–90 -0.137 -0.101
(0.050) (0.050)
yr 90–95 -0.064 -0.027
(0.036) (0.037)
yr 95–00 0.127 0.106
(0.032) (0.040)
yr 00–03 0.149 0.120
(0.048) (0.049)
CC × yr 85–90 -0.105 -0.135 -0.079 -0.119
(0.017) (0.023) (0.019) (0.032)
× yr 90–95 -0.051 -0.108 -0.003 -0.042
(0.011) (0.026) (0.015) (0.032)
yr 95–00 0.077 0.059 0.103 0.096
(0.012) (0.022) (0.016) (0.031)
yr 00–03 0.109 0.126 0.123 0.164
(0.017) (0.028) (0.023) (0.034)
two-way FEs Y Y Y Y
N 3,882 2,933 3,882 2,933
R2 0.370 0.334 0.440 0.297
Notes: C3: the three central wards of Tokyo/Osaka city; C8: the eight central wards of Tokyo city, by
excluding the three central wards; CC: the city of Tokyo (excluding the eight central wards), or the city of
Osaka (excluding the three central wards). Constant term coefficients are not reported. Heteroskedasticity
robust standard errors (clustered at the municipality level) in parentheses.
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Table 10: Changes in the types of housing starts before and after the bubble burst.
Region Number of prefectures "built-to-sell""built-to-sell"+"built-to-rent"
mean 1985–1990 (A) mean 1995–2000 (B) B – A
Tokyo MA 4 37.8% 68.1% 30.3%
Osaka MA 5 50.6% 61.8% 11.2%
The remaining pref. 38 36.0% 36.4% 0.4%
Notes: The reported data refer to the prefecture mean of the proportion of "built-to-sell" dwellings in the
total floor area of housing starts of "built-to-sell" and "built-to-rent" dwellings in the 1985–1990 period
(during the bubble boom) and the 1995–2000 period (after the bubble burst) for the specific groups.
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Table A1: Summary statistics.
Variable Obs. Mean Std.Dev. Min. Max. Obs. Mean Std.Dev. Min. Max.
Panel A Tokyo prefecture (cross-section) Osaka prefecture (cross-section)
Annualized pop. growth 49 0.608 0.504 -0.116 2.945 56 0.154 0.615 -0.904 1.974
1990–2015 (%)
Annualized pop. growth 49 0.277 1.368 -3.319 4.084 56 0.269 0.923 -1.212 3.251
1980–1990 (%)
NDPR 1990 49 1.022 0.354 0.038 1.531 56 1.014 0.272 0.097 1.372
NDPR 1980 49 1.023 0.304 0.058 1.433 56 1.007 0.251 0.131 1.285
Dist. from Tokyo/Osaka 49 18.7 12.9 0.0 44.9 56 13.6 10.0 0.0 45.5
station (km)
Population per km2 1990 49 10,259 4,990 1,091 20,506 56 8,522 5,337 977 19,552
Population per km2 1980 49 10,390 5,772 956 22,710 56 8,592 5,770 706 21,244
Panel B Tokyo MA (1980–2003) Osaka MA (1980–2003)
Pop. growth rate (%) 3,690 0.732 1.184 -4.836 8.045 2,806 0.212 1.332 -13.350 13.657
Total housing starts (mil. m2) 3,882 0.188 0.161 0.011 1.160 2,933 0.126 0.119 0.013 1.624
Housing starts (m2) per capita 3,876 1.071 0.422 0.246 8.706 2,931 0.948 0.479 0.247 5.998
Proportion "built-to-sell" (1) 3,882 0.294 0.167 0.000 0.897 2,933 0.298 0.182 0.000 0.890
Proportion "built-to-sell" (2) 3,882 0.527 0.216 0.000 1.000 2,933 0.541 0.240 0.000 1.000
Area of parks (ha) 1,913 86.5 87.6 0 681 1,712 87.1 122.6 0 977
Number of hospitals 1,913 9.1 7.8 1 46 1,712 8.8 7.8 1 46
Number of clinics 1,913 126.0 137.4 10 808 1,712 117.0 113.3 12 740
Number of criminal 1,913 3,659 3,642 0 29,155 1,712 3,015 3,295 175 30,917
offenses perceived
abs(female pop./pop.−0.5) 1,913 .008 .006 0 0.034 1,712 0.014 0.010 0 0.094
Panel C the city of Tokyo (1980–2003) the city of Osaka (1980–2003)
Pop. growth rate (%) 529 -0.221 1.210 -4.836 4.256 552 -0.104 1.033 -3.417 4.486
Housing starts (m2) per capita 529 1.102 0.697 0.246 8.706 552 0.994 0.510 0.247 4.235
Notes: NDPR: Nighttime-to-daytime population ratio. Proportion "built-to-sell" (1): "built-to-sell"
dwellings relative to the total housing starts (inm2). Proportion "built-to-sell" (2): "built-to-sell" dwellings
relative to the sum of "built-to-sell" and "built-to-rent" dwellings (in m2). abs(female pop./pop.−0.5): the
absolute value of (female population/population−0.5). Residential population data are obtained from
the Residential Population Survey conducted by the Local Administration Bureau, Ministry of Internal
Affairs and Communications. Data on daytime population are obtained from the Tokyo Prefectural
Statistical Yearbook and the Osaka Prefectural Statistical Yearbook (various years). Data on housing
starts are obtained from the Annual Report of Architectural Statistics, which is released by the Ministry of
Land, Infrastructure, Transport, and Tourism (Department of Information Management, Policy Bureau);
data for 2007 are missing. Data on the area of parks are obtained from the Prefectural Statistics by the
Prefectural Statistical Bureau. Data on the number of hospitals and clinics are obtained from the Health
Statistics Office, the Ministry of Health, Labour, and Welfare. Data on the number of criminal offenses
perceived are obtained from the Metropolitan Police Department. A municipality’s distance from the
core of the central city is based on the longitude-latitude-based distance measure.
39
